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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TIMOTHY SCOTT BIRD, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20020114-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to either take from Bird 
on the record an admission to the alleged probation violation or make adequate findings 
on the record that Bird willfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation 
based on the evidence proffered at the order to show cause hearing before revoking 
Bird's probation as required by case law and Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12). This 
Court reviews claims of plain error for obvious and prejudicial error. State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether Bird was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the order to show 
cause hearing when his probation was revoked. A claim of ineffectiveness presents a 
mixed question of law and fact. State v. Templin, 805 P,2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
Nonetheless, "ineffective assistance of counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject 
to de novo review of the ultimate legal question of whether the defendant has received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). 
To establish a claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: "(1) that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that 
the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel1 s error." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 
P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Timothy Scott Bird appeals from the order of the Third District Court revoking 
his probation and sentencing him to a term of 0-10 years in the Utah State Prison. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Timothy Scott Bird was charged by information filed in Third District Court on 
or about October 3, 2000, with: rape of a child, a first degree felony; sodomy upon a 
child, a first degree felony; and aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree 
felony (R. 2-3). 
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On December 21, 2000, Bird waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 37). 
On or about January 5, 2001, Bird plead guilty to three counts of attempted sexual 
abuse of a child, third degree felonies (R. 40, 48). 
On April 20, 2001, Bird was sentenced by Judge Randall Skanchy to 0-5 years 
in the Utah State Prison on count I, 0-5 years on count n, and 0-5 years on count III. 
Counts I and II were to be consecutive sentences and count III was to be concurrent (R. 
60-61). The prison terms were suspended and Bird was placed on 36-months probation 
(R. 60-61, 112). 
At a review hearing held on August 24, 2001, before Judge Bruce Lubeck, Bird 
was ordered to complete the sex-specific treatment program at the Northern Utah 
Correctional Center half-way house (R. 68-70, 113). 
On or about December 18, 2001, AP&P filed an Order to Show Cause alleging 
that Bird had violated his probation by not entering into the Northern Utah Correctional 
Center (NUCCC) sex-offender program (R. 74, 77-78). At the time the Order to 
Show Cause was filed, Bird was incarcerated at the Salt Lake County Jail and had been 
housed there since October of 2000 (R. 75). AP&P recommended that Bird's probation 
be revoked and that he be placed in the Utah State Prison for sex offender 
programming (R. 75, 77-78). 
On January 11, 2002, an Order to Show Cause hearing was held before Judge 
Michael K. Burton (R. 83-84). At the hearing, the trial court revoked Bird's probation 
and ordered that the original sentence be imposed with counts I and II to be served 
consecutively and count III concurrently (R. 83-84). The trial court also recommended 
that Bird be given credit for eighteen months time served; and recommended that Bird 
be considered for a sex offenders program "as soon as possible" (R. 84, 86-87). 
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On February 11, 2002, Bird filed a Notice of Appeal in Third District Court in 
relation to the trial court's revocation of his probation (R. 88). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On September 20, 1999, Bird was placed on 36 months probation by Third 
District Court Judge William B. Bohling in Case No. 981902501 for committing the 
following offenses: sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony; sexual abuse of a 
child, a third degree felony; and lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemeanor 
(Pre-Sentence Report at 10). One of the conditions of Bird's probation was that he 
successfully complete the Fremont Community Corrections Center inpatient sex 
offender treatment program (Id.). 
Bird entered the Fremont program on January 24, 2000 (Pre-Sentence Report at 
10). During a therapeutic polygraph on September 25, 2000, Bird admitted to other 
victims--including the victim in this case-which had not been previously revealed (Id.). 
In addition, in August of 2000, the South Salt Lake Police Department was contacted 
by a sheriffs office in California concerning a wport that the victim in this case had 
been sexually abused by Bird on two occasions (Pre-Sentence Report at 2). 
On October 5, 2000, Bird was arrested on the current offenses. He was 
removed from the Fremont program and placed in the Salt Lake County Jail (Pre-
sentence report at 8, 11). On or about January 5, 2001, Bird plead guilty to three 
counts of attempted sexual abuse of a child, third degree felonies (R. 40, 48). 
On April 20, 2001, Bird was sentenced by Judge Randall Skanchy to 0-5 years 
in the Utah State Prison on count I, 0-5 years on count II, and 0-5 years on count III. 
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Count 11 J nil 11 were to be consecutive sentences and count III was to be concurrent (R. 
60-61). The prison terms were suspended and Bird was placed on 36-months probation 
with the following terms and conditions: One, serve 365 days in jail with no credit for 
time served. Two, be screened for Fremont or Northern Utah Correctional or any 
other program recommended by APPD. Three, complete any recommended program 
and treatment. Four, pay victim restitution. Five, undergo testing for HTV and STD. 
Six, write a letter of apology to the victim and send it to the court for approval (R. 60-
61, 112). 
At a review held on August 24, 2001, before Judge Bruce Lubeck, Bird was 
ordered to complete the sex-specific treatment program at the Not them Utah 
Correctional Center half-way house (R. 68-70, 113). 
On or about December 18, 2001, AP&P filed an Oidu to Show Cause alleging 
that Bird had violated his probation by not entering into the Northern Utah Correctional 
Center (NUCCC) sex-offender program (R. 74, 77-78). The progress/violation report 
indicated: 
This case has been staffed by the NUCCC. They will not accept Mr. Bird 
because his primary residence is in Salt Lake City and he failed the Fremont 
Program The Bonneville CCC staffed this case and they do not accept 
probationers into their sex offender program. This case was resubmitted to the 
Fremont CCC program for reconsideration. Since he previously failed their 
program and was deceptive to facility staff and treatment providers, they do not 
believe Mi Bird is appropriate for their program. Therefore, there is not an 
impatient treatment or community correctional center program available to Mr. 
Bird at this time 
(R. 75). AP&P recommended that Bird's probation be revoked and that he be placed in 
the Utah State Prison for sex offender programming (R. 75, 77-78). 
On January 11, 2002, an Order to Show Cause hearing was held before Judge 
Michael K. Burton (R. 83-84, 114). At the hearing Bird's counsel admitted that it was 
true that Bird had failed to enter the Northern Utah Correctional Center sex offender 
program because he was in custody (R. 114 at 2-3). At the hearing, it was proffered 
that at the time Bird initially started treatment at Fremont he was advised by the 
attorney who represented him at the time not to answer questions as to other victims 
and offenses which was the reason for the initial failure to disclose which was largely 
responsible for his termination from the program (R. 114 at 5). It was also proffered 
that Fremont would not accept Bird back in to their program and that Northern Utah 
would not accept Bird into their program because they were no longer accepting Salt 
Lake county residents (R. 114 at 6). 
At the close of the hearing, the trial court revoked Bird's probation and ordered 
that the original sentence be imposed with counts I and II to be served consecutively 
and count HI concurrently (R. 83-84, 114 at 10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bird asserts that the trial court committed plain error in revoking his probation 
without doing the following: One, take from Bird on the record an admission to the 
alleged probation violation. In fact, Bird asserts that the trial court's finding in the 
minute entry to the revocation hearing that he admitted the allegation is clearly 
erroneous. Two, make adequate findings based on the evidence proffered at the 
6 
hearing that Bird either willfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation or 
that the alleged violation presently threatened the safety of society. 
Bird also asserts for the same reasons that he was denied the effective assistance 
of counsel at the revocation hearing as counsel failed to assert his right to due process, 
the requirement that any violation be found by the trial court to be either willful or pose 
a present threat to the safety of society, and that the trial court was obligated by statute 
and case law to make adequate findings as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for 
the revocation. 
Finally, Bird asserts that he was prejudicied by the obvious errors of the trial 
court and the deficient performance of counsel as his probation was revoked and he was 
sentenced to 0-10 years in the Utah State Prison without due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN REVOKING 
BIRD'S PROBATION WITHOUT FIRST EITHER TAKING AN 
ADMISSION FROM BIRD THAT HE HAD VIOLATED 
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF HIS PROBATION OR MAKING 
ADEQUATE FINDINGS BASED ON THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE 
THAT BIRD WILLFULLY VIOLATED HIS PROBATION AS 
REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 77-18-1(12) 
"It is well settled that a probationer shall be accorded due process at revocation 
proceedings because revoking probation seriously deprives a person of his or her 
liberty." State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Smith v. 
Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah 1990)). See also, State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
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In Utah probation revocation proceedings must be conducted pursuant to the 
procedural requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12). State v. Cannoles, 
2000 UT App 363. This Court has held that "the plain meaning of section 77-18-1 leads 
to the conclusion that probationers may elect either to have a hearing complete with all 
the statutory protections set forth in subsections (b) through (e) or may waive the right to 
a hearing thereby foregoing the procedural safeguards guaranteed in the statute." State v. 
Martin, 1999 UT App 62, f9, 976 P.2d 1224. Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-
18-l(12)(d)(i) and (ii) specifies that at the order to show cause hearing "the defendant 
shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit" and that if the defendant denies the 
allegations then evidence shall be presented. In addition, the trial court has an obligation 
to ensure that adequate findings exist in the trial court record which demonstrate and 
reveal "the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation." State v. Hodges, 
798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1990). See also, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 
S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). This obligation is also statutorily placed on the trial 
court at Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-l(12)(e)(i): "After the hearing the court shall 
make findings of fact." 
Bird asserts that the trial court committed plain error in failing to either take from 
him on the record an admission to the alleged probation violation or make adequate 
findings based on the evidence proffered at the hearing that Bird wilfully violated the 
terms and conditions of his probation. 
A. Bird did not admit to the probation violation on the record. 
The minute entry to the order to show cause hearing held on January 11, 2002, 
indicates that Bird admitted to the allegation **as stated in the Affidavit and Order to 
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Show Cause" (R. 83). However, the transcript of the hearing which is included in the 
Addenda does not support such a conclusion and that such a finding is clearly erroneous 
(R. 114). No where in the transcript does Bird personally admit to the allegation. No 
where in the transcript was Bird asked to personally admit or deny the allegation as 
required by Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12)(d)(i). The only colloquy which took 
place at the hearing concerning the allegation was between the trial court and Bird's trial 
counsel, Heidi Buchi: 
The Court: It says here he failed to answer. 
Ms. Buchi: —that's true, because he's been in custody. 
The Court: So, that's harder to do then 
(R. 114 at 2-3). Bird asserts that this dialogue between the trial court and trial counsel is 
insufficient to establish a conclusion that he admitted to the allegation as required by 
statute. Cf State v. Cannoles, 2000 UT App 363 (defendant waived right to hearing 
stating through counsel that he wanted "to resolve it today" and admitted the allegations 
that he had violated probation) with State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1990) (no 
admission to allegations and hearing held with disputed facts placed in evidence). 
Moreover, Bird asserts that the requirement that "the defendant shall admit or 
deny the allegations in the affidavit" presents a situation that is identical in scope and 
magnitude to the taking of pleas in all criminal cases which is governed by Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 11(b) states: "A defendant may plead not guilty, 
guilty.... If a defendant refuses to plead..., the court shall enter a plea of not guilty." Bird 
asserts that without an affirmative admission by him to the allegation in the affidavit the 
trial court could not properly conclude that he admitted to the allegation. 
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Accordingly, Bird asserts that the trial court erroneously found in the minute entry 
that he admitted to the allegation. Furthermore, given that the plain language of Utah 
Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12)(d)(i) clearly establishes that the "defendant shall admit or 
deny the allegations of the affidavit", Bird asserts that this error was also obvious 
particularly in light of the responsibility placed on the trial court to ensure that the 
procedural requirements of the statute and due process are satisfied. See State v. Labrum, 
925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996) (holding failure to make written findings was plain error 
because gang enhancement statute specifically required them). Bird likewise asserts that 
he was harmed by the trial court's error because his probation was revoked based on an 
erroneous assumption that he admitted to willfully violating the terms and conditions of 
his probation. 
B. The trial court failed to make adequate findings that Bird willfully violated 
the terms and conditions of his probation prior to revocation. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12)(e)(i) states that after the order to show cause 
hearing "the court shall make findings of fact." In addition, due process requires that the 
trial court clearly reveal in the record "the evidence relied on and the reasons for 
revoking probation." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1990). See also, 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1761-62, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). 
Bird has established that the trial court's finding that he admitted to the allegation is 
clearly erroneous. Therefore, the trial court was required to make findings from the 
evidence proffered at the hearing that Bird willfully violated the terms and conditions of 
his probation prior to revoking the probation. 
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"This Court has previously held that i n order for a trial court to revoke probation 
based on a probationviolation, the court must determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the violation was willful.'" State v Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, [^24, 997 
P.2d 314, cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) (quoting State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 
989, 991 (Utah App. 1994)). See also, Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276. In this context, a 
"finding of willfulness 'merely requires a finding that the probationer did not make bona 
fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation.'" Peterson, 869 P.2d at 991 (quoting 
State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah App. 1991)). 
Bird asserts that the trial court committed plain error in failing to make factual 
findings and failing to clearly reveal in the record 'the evidence relied on and the reasons 
for revoking probation." Moreover, Bird asserts that the trial court committed plain error 
in not specifically finding that he willfully violated the terms and conditions of his 
probation and that he did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his 
probation. 
In fact, Bird asserts that the trial court wholly failed to make any findings as to the 
willflillness of the alleged violation. Furthermore, as in State v. Hodges, the transcript 
"fails to adequately show the court's reasons for revoking appellant's probation. 
Specifically, the transcript does not reveal whether appellant was found in willful 
violation of the conditions of his probation, or whether he was simply found, through no 
fault of his own, to be unable to make adequate progress" or be accepted into an inpatient 
sex offender program. 798 P.2d at 274. In fact, the evidence as preferred indicates that 
Bird was unable to make adequate progress during his prior treatment at Fremont 
because he was told by previous counsel not to disclose other victims so that when he 
finally did disclose-which lead to a conviction dfr these charges-he was unable to be 
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accepted back into Fremont (R. 114 at 5). Similarly, Bird was unable to gain admission 
to the program at Northern Utah because they were no longer accepting Salt Lake 
county residents (R. 114 at 6). 
In order for the trial court to avoid making a finding that Bird willfully violated 
his probation, the court would have had to find that the violation "must presently threaten 
the safety of society." Hodges, 798 P.2d at 277. However, the trial court also failed to 
make any finding that Bird's inability to be accepted into a program "presently threatens 
the safety of society." The trial court simply did not consider this issue as was necessary 
when he failed to find a willful violation. Instead the trial court seemed to base his 
decision to revoke Bird's probation and send him to prison on the facts underlying the 
charges and the notion that the punishment fit the crime: 
The Court: —and I have to be candid with you, this kind of offense, in 
any community, I think it can't be tolerated.... 
So, I have really no compunction sending you to prison. I 
appreciate you're as worthy an individual as anybody to be watched 
over, cared for, nurtured, right? But there are six people at least 
who we know who have been harmed and it doesn't seem to me that 
this prison term is disproportionate to the crime you've committed. 
So, we've got those two competing interests, your own 
benefit plus some kind of punishment for the harm that we can't in 
any way condone in this society, so I think that's where I come out, 
that's why I comfortable sending you to prison 
(R. 114 at 14). 
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Bird asserts that the trial court erred in failing to make adequate findings that he 
wilfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation or that the violation "presently 
threatened the safety of society." Moreover, Bird asserts that this error was obvious. 
The plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1(12)(e)(i) clearly requires that the 
trial court make factual findings after the order to show cause hearing. Furthermore, the 
due process requirements established in Gagnon and Hodges have been precedent for 
more than ten years. This Court in Hodges, in addition to the Utah Code, squarely places 
the responsibility of ensuring that the record contains adequate findings on the shoulders 
of the trial court. Finally, Bird asserts that the trial court's failure to make such findings 
was harmful as his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to prison without the 
requirements of due process being satisfied. In addition, in general the "[fjailure of the 
trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in 
the record are 'clear, uncontro verted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor 
of the judgment.'" Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella 
v. Bough, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1980)). 
POINT II 
BIRD WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
AT THE PROBATION REVOCATION HEARING 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1 (12)(c)(iii) statutorily creates a right to counsel at 
probation revocation proceedings. Accordingly, Bird asserts that the constitutional 
right to effective counsel also exists and that he was denied the assistance of such 
counsel at the revocation hearing. In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the 
Defendant's burden to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in 
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some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have 
been different but for counsel's error." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 
1989). 
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Bird must show that trial 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 
1993). To meet this prong, defendants "must prove that specific, identified acts or 
omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Bird asserts that trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient based upon 
the following arguments which parallel the trial court's errors argued in Point I: 
One, trial counsel failed to assert that Bird is entitled to procedural due process 
at revocation proceedings. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782; Hodges, 798 P.2d at 273; 
Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1067. 
Two, trial counsel similarly failed to argue that under State v. Hodges the trial 
court before revoking his probation must either find that Bird willfully violated the 
terms and conditions of his probation or that the .violation "must presently threaten the 
safety of society." 798 P.2d at 276, 277. Furthermore, trial counsel failed to argue that 
in the context of a revocation hearing willfullness means that "the probationer did not 
make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation." Peterson, 869 P.2d at 
991. In addition, trial counsel failed to point out the similarities of this case and 
Hodges and the issue of whether there was a willful violation of the terms and 
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conditions of probation Or whether through no fault of his own, Bird had not been 
accepted into an inpatient program. 
Three, trial counsel failed to assert that the trial court was required by both the 
plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-l(12)(e)(i) and Hodges I Gagnon to 
make adequate findings on the record as to the "evidence relied on and the reasons for 
revoking probation." Hodges, 798 P.2d at 274; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786. As argued 
in Point I, the trial court failed to adequately make such findings. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a 
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. A reasonable probability has been 
described as that "sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. Bird asserts 
that for the same reasons he was prejudiced by the trial court's obvious errors, he was 
prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance-namely that his probation was 
revoked and he was sentenced to 0-10 years in the Utah State Prison without adequate 
attention paid to due process safeguards and without adequate factual findings made to 
establish that he either willfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation or 
that the alleged probation violation "presently threatened the safety of society" 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Bird asks that this Court find that the obvious and 
harmful errors of the trial court, and the deficient and prejudicial performance of 
counsel, at the revocation hearing require the reversal of the Third District Court's 
order revoking his probation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of October, 2002. 
/^^U^i/^ 
Margaret P. Lindsay jr 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 





UTAH COBITQF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
t~r Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abey-
4& ance — Probation — Supervision — Presen-
? tence investigation — Standards — Con&den-
z tiality — Terms and conditions — 
|r Termination, revocation, modification, or ex-
^ tension — Hearings — Electronic monitoring, 
jn a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant 
auction with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court 
|d the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77* Chapter 
08 in Abeyance,, and under the terms of the plea in 
fee agreement. 
!> On a plea of guilty* guilty and mentally ill, no 
tf^st, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court 
rr suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
ice the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
fen riant. 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the De-
partment of Corrections except in cases of class C 
* misdemeanors or infractions; 
J (ii) on probation with an agency of local govern-
v
 ment or with a private organization; or 
*  -" (iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court. 
b> (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the 





 (ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as or-
dered by the court. 
'— (hi) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all 
^probationers. 
iJ^ The department shall establish supervision and 
sentence investigation standards for all individuals 
erred to the department. These standards shall be 
led on: 
?T (I) the type of offense; 
J (ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria estabhshed by the department to 
determine what level of services shall be provided, 
b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards 
dl be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board 
fardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and 
ament prior to adoption by the department. 
B> The Judicial Council and the department shall 
ahlish procedures to implement the supervision and 
estigation standards. 
a) The Judicial Council and the department shall 
luafly consider modifications to the standards based 
*a criteria m Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as 
y consider appropriate. 
&) The Judicial Council and the department shall 
uially prepare an impact report and submit it to the 
>ropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee, 
otwithstanding other provisions of law, the depart-
y not required to supervise the probation of persons 
** of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to 
presentence investigation reports on class C misde-
s or infractions. However, the department may super-
- probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance 
Partment standards. 
l) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court 
% with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the 
e for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period 
^ e for the purpose of obtaining a presentence inves-
*won report from the department or information from 
er sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall inc&tfeiT 
victim impact statement according" to guidelines set in 
Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on 
the victim and the victim's family/ " * Vw* 
(c) The presentence investigation report shaD include a 
specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by 
a recommendation from the department regarding the 
payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in 
accordance withr Title 77, Chapter^  38a, Crime ^ pctxms 
RestitutionActT "* ^ *~\&j&*> 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation re-
port, including any diagnostic evaluation, report ordered 
by the court under Section 76-3-4Q4, are protected and are 
not available except by court order for purposes of sen- < 
tencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for 
use by the department. , - < * ,^/^ **~* 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence in-
vestigation report to the defendant's attorney; or the 
defendant if not represented by counsel* the prosecutor,' 
and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the ' 
parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be 
brought to the attention of the sentencing judge,'and the 
judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with theJ depart-
ment. If after ten working days the ^accuracies cannot be 
resolved, the court shall make a determination of rel-
evance and accuracy on the record. c 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the 
presentence investigation report at the time of sentenc-
ing, that matter shall be considered to^be waived.
 Cf ^ 
(7) At the time of sentence, the courts shall receive, any 
testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the 
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appro-
priate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall 
be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the 
defendant. 
(8> While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the 
court may require that the defendant: - * 
(a) perform any or all of the following 
(i> pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at 
the time of being placed on probation; *c *\_- c 
(ii) pay ^ mounts required under Title 77, Chapter 
32a, Defense Costs; * 
(iii) provide for the support of others, for whose 
support he is legally liable; - ' *' 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in 
a county jail designated by the- department/ after 
considering any recommendation by the court as to 
which jail the court finds most appropriate;* ~A 
(vi) serve a term of home confiiemenVwtacI* niay 
mclude the use of electronic monitoring; "* ~ -
(vii) participate in compensatory service irestitu-
tion programs, including the compensatory service 
program provided m Section 78-11-20.7; 
(vni) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, 
and treatment services; - • ** 
(IX) make restitution or reparation to the victim or 
victims with interest in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the 
court considers appropriate; and * 7 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5,1997: . 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a 
high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or 
a vocational certificate at the defendant's own ex-
pense if the defendant has not received the diploma, 
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GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to 
being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to ob-
tain one of the items listed in Subsection (8XbXi) 
because of! 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account 
receivable as defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and 
any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period 
in. accordance with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court 
orders supervised probation and any extension of that 
period by the department in accordance with Subsection 
(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the 
discretion of the court or upon completion without 
violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If^  upon expiration or termination of the 
probation period under Subsection (lOXaXl), 
there remains an unpaid balance upon the ac-
count receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, 
the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and 
continue the defendant on bench probation for 
the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of 
the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the 
court sha)] record in the registry of CJVD judg-
ments any unpaid balance not already recorded 
and immediately transfer responsibility to collect 
the account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Col-
lection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its own motio^ 
the court may require the defendant to show cause 
why his failure to pay should not be treated a^ 
contempt of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing 
court, the Office of State Debt Collection, and the 
prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all 
cases when termination of supervised probation win 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation 
progress report and complete report of details On 
outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of 
confinement after having been charged with a proba-
tion violation and prior to a hearing to revoke proba-
tion does not constitute service of time toward the 
total probation term unless the probationer is exon-
erated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a 
hearing or decision concerning revocation of proba-
tion does not constitute service of time toward the 
total probation term unless the probationer is exon-
erated at the hearing, 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon 
the filing of a violation report with the court alleging
 a 
violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon 
the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the 
court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended 
except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer c)r 
upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon
 a 
hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of 
probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging* 
particularity facts asserted to constitute violati< 
the conditions of probation, the court that authoi 
probation shall determine if the affidavit establj 
probable cause to believe that revocation, modi 
tion, or extension of probation is justified. ? 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable ca 
it shall cause to be served on the defendant a waij 
for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an ordj 
show cause why his probation should not be revtj 
modified, or extended. *| 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a tim? 
place for the hearing and shall be served upon* 
defendant at least five days prior to the hearing 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause f< 
continuance. % 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform* 
defendant of a right to be represented by counsl 
the hearing and to have counsel appointed for hi 
he is indigent. ; | 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant 
right to present evidence. J^  
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admi 
deny the allegations of the affidavit. ' | 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of 
affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present 
dence on the allegations. A 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse infbf 
tion on which the allegations are based shal 
presented as witnesses subject to questioning bjj 
defendant unless the court for good cause otha 
orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, app 
speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.^  
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make i 
of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violate 
conditions of probation, the court may orde 
probation revoked, modified, continued, or thai 
entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shal 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed a 
be executed. |j 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit nig 
to the custody of the Division of Substance Abuse and Me 
Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a concfa 
of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintenc 
of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified tg 
court that: <J| 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can be* 
from treatment at the state hospital; Jg 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available fog 
defendant; and J | 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-6100 
are receiving priority for treatment over the defend* 
described in this Subsection (13). ^f 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including pre 
tence diagnostic evaluations, are classified protected in a| 
dance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records A3 
and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-40$ 
63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not ordet| 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except 
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this sect 
the department may disclose the presentence m v e s ^ 8 | 
only when: "•"» 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection J 
202(7); M 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency o r ^ 
agency approved by the department for purposes o| 


























IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TIMOTHY SCOTT, BIRD, 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
Case No. 001916883FS 
POST-SENTENCING HEARING 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 11th day of 
January, 2002, commencing at the hour of 9:58 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: CHOU CHOU COLLINS 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendant: HEIDI ANNE BUCHI 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH M107 
1 I 
1
 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: Are you wanting anybody, Ms. Buchi, 
4 o r — 
5 MS, BUCHI: I am. I would like to call the 
6 Timothy Bird matter. 
7 THE BAILIFF: Timothy Bird. 
8 THE COURT: I looked in the file and got the 
9 sense that this was an order to show cause hearing, but I 
10 can't see the allegation. We've got the—the order to 
11 show cause, but I don't have what he's supposed to have 
12 I done or not done. 
13 MS. BUCHI: Well, the allegation, your Honor, 
14 is that he failed to complete the Northern Utah 
15 Correctional Facility sexual offender program. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Strongberg, can you get me a 
17 copy? He's always good. 
18 MS. BUCHI: He is. 
19 THE COURT: (Inaudible) computer somewhere— 
20 No, we looked a little bit today, Marcy did, 
21 and couldn't find it, so he didn't even go in; is that 
22 right? 
23 MS. BUCHI: Well— 
24 THE COURT: It says here he failed to answer. 
25 MS. BUCHI: —that's true, because he's been in 
1
 custody. 
2 THE COURT: So, that's harder to do then. 
3 MS. BUCHI: It is harder to do* 
4 This is the history of this case, your Honor, 
5 since you are about the fifth judge— 
6 THE COURT: I looked at—I was able to read the 
7 sentencing, the transcript of the sentencing that you— 
8 MS. BUCHI: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: —talked with Judge— 
10 MS. BUCHI: Skanchy. 
11 THE COURT: —Skanchy that day. 
12 MS. BUCHI: And Mr. Cope did as well. 
13 THE COURT: Cope was here, that's righto You, 
14 Cope and—okay. 
15 MS. BUCHI: At the sentencing, Judge Skanchy 
16 ordered that he be screened for acceptance at Fremont, 
17 Bonneville, Northern Utah and Orange Street. We came 
18 back three times for reviews on that. At the last review 
19 in August of last year, the judge—and you know, I don't 
20 remember which judge it was that day, but I don't believe 
21 it was Judge Skanchy— 
22 THE COURT: By then, it might have been Lubeck. 
23 MS. BUCHI: It was Judge Lubeck. 
24 Ordered that he go to Northern Utah and he 







ones turned him down 
because he was— 
Had Northern Utah accepted him by 
Well— 
Because you were screening, I guess 
—we were screening and the other 
and the reason they turned him is 
THE COURT: Because of Fremont? 
MS. BUCHI: —he was at Fremont originally— 
THE COURT: And he messed up some way. In 
their view. 
MS. BUCHI: Well, part of the treatment program 
at Fremont— 
THE COURT: Is— 
MS. BUCHI: — i s — 
THE COURT: —to admit your stuff. 
MS. BUCHI: —to admit any other victims and 
also to take— 
THE COURT: And he (inaudible) 
MS. BUCHI: —of that— 
THE COURT: I guess they somehow interpreted 
that to be a violation, huh? 
MS. BUCHI: He—and I didn't represent him at 
that time, your Honor, he did have private counsel at 
4 
1 that time* I believe through ray conversations with both 
2 Mr. Bird and with his mother, that at the time that he 
3 was initially starting the treatment at Fremont, he was 
4 advised by his attorney not to answer those questions 
5 initially. Then he did answer them and— 
6 THE COURT: So, they found him to be non-
7 compliant or some such? 
8 MS. BUCHI: That is correct. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MS. BUCHI: And that—and that is unfortunate 
11 for Mr. Bird. 
12 THE COURT: Because Fremont would be the one 
13 that would normally take him? 
14 MS. BUCHI: That is correct. 
15 They have indicated, and I've spoken with them 
16 as well, as has Mr. Hibler and, you know, a lot of 
17 people, a lot of us have spoken to Fremont. It's my 
18 belief that at this point, they're still not willing to 
19 take him back because of that initial non-compliance and 
20 I can certainly understand the position on that* 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MS. BUCHI: It's also, I think unfortunate for 
23 Mr. Bird that he was following the counsel—the attorney 
24 that he had the time— 
25 THE COURT: I guess the reality is, though, 
we're stuck with that—-
MS- BUCHI: The reality is we are stuck with 
that, but he has been in custody since October 5th of 
2000. And these—these charges, although they were 
brought as new charges were as a result of his disclosure 
at Fremont. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BUCHI: Mr. Bird—I mean, I guess it's not 
the direct fault of Mr. Bird that Northern Utah wouldn't 
take him. Certainly through the process of when he was 
at Fremont and—and also, I believe, Northern Utah isn't 
taking anybody from Salt Lake County anymore, that's— 
THE COURT: What seems to me what's here— 
MS. BUCHI: —as well— 
THE COURT: I don't know who's written this, 
that's Mr. Hibler, I guess, huh? 
MS. BUCHI: Yes. Mr. Hibler. 
THE COURT: Seems to say that—yeah, 'cause he 
lives in Salt Lake County and he failed Fremont, so I 
guess those two reasons. 
MS. BUCHI: That's correct. 
And I guess, your Honor, you know, Mr. Bird 
has, at least since the time that I have represented him 
and—and I believe that's the offer that he was given by 
Mr. Cope is a reflection of his willingness to admit and 
6 
1 to admit that he needed treatment and I think that's 
2 covered pretty well in the sentencing colloquy that both 
3 Mr. Cope and I had* 
4 THE COURT: True. 
5 MS. BUCHI: Mr. Bird wants treatment, has 
6 always wanted treatment, at least from my beginning to 
7 represent him in October of 2000. And so I—I think it's 
8 unfortunate we're at this point right now where he's 
9 still wanting treatment and is unable to begin to do 
10 that, because he certainly does and he's been 15 months 
11 now without treatment that he knows that he needs. 
12 He also understands that the victims need 
13 treatment or need reparation for that, which he is 
14 willing to provide and that's—that's, at least in my 
15 conversations with Ms. Andruzzi, that's certainly a 
16 result of this conviction, of these convictions, are that 
17 the victims in this can get restitution for their 
18 treatment and that they can initiate that process. He 
19 is—he agrees with all of that. 
20 I just—I would hate to see him go to prison 
21 when he's been up front and—at least in the time that 
22 I've been representing him, that he's— 
23 THE COURT: The conundrum is that nobody can 
24 treat him but the prison; right? Or nobody will accept 
25 him. 
MS. BUCHI: As an in-patient, nobody will, 
THE COURT: Well, I guess our other problem is 
the number of victims here almost scream at you, we can't 
let him out until at least we've given him a shot, that's 
my—kind of how I read Judge Skanchy and at least the 
report Hibler's got here, that it's an in-patient kind of 
thing or it's not. 
So, your concern is, you think that the 
prison's a little too much for what— 
MS* BUCHI: My concern is the same— 
THE COURT: —he's done? 
MS. BUCHI: —and—and when I talked to Mr. 
Hibler, he indicated this was not true. My understanding 
previously and I think it was also Mr. Cope's is that if 
he did go to prison, he would not begin receiving the 
treatment until within two to three years of his release. 
THE COURT: What— 
MS. BUCHI: But when I talked to Mr. Hibler, he 
said that he would probably go in close to immediately 
and I'm not really familiar with that. I—he told me 
that it wasn't—that wasn't the case any more, that he 
would go in quickly. 
THE COURT: Mr. Strongberg, do you have a view, 
based on some, knowledge? Maybe you do. 
MR. STRONGBERG: I would—I would go with what 
8 
1 young girl, I guess she's in California now? 
2 MS- BUCHI: Yes. 
3
 THE COURT: Christine would be the name? I 
4 mean, she's only one of six and just to read the negative 
5 impact it's had there, it's really hard, Mr. Bird, to 
6 say, well, you know, we'll just let you out after a year-
7 and-a-half. I mean, the harm you've caused is so wide-
8 spread, it probably can't be measured, really* 
9 So, I guess what you want me is—to do is to 
10 decide something, so I think what I need to do now is 
11 commit you to a prison. You've got the zero to five. If 
12 I read this right, one of them is consecutive to one of 
13 them and the third one's concurrent, so I guess you've 
14 got a zero to ten, essentially is what you are. 
15 MS. BUCHI: And your Honor, I would ask— 
16 THE COURT: I--I think I can— 
17 MS. BUCHI: —amend it as to (inaudible) 
18 THE COURT: Can I give you credit for the year-
19 and-a-half? 
20 MS. BUCHI: You can request that the Board give 
21 him credit for the time served. 
22 THE COURT: I'll do that, request a year-and-a-
23 half. 
24 MS. BUCHI: I would request, since that 
25 sentence was given with a—with an understanding that he 
10 
1 Mr, Hibler's indicated, that's—he's from our sex 
2 offender unit and I would imagine he has a clear 
3 understanding— 
4 THE COURT: Well, does Hibler— 
5 MR. STRONGBERG: —of that program. 
6 THE COURT: «—of course, he works with this 
7 kind of inmate. 
8 MR. STRONGBERG: Exactly. 
9 MS. BUCHI: He does. 
10 MR. STRONGBERG: And the fact that he's:be^ U< 
11 jail since October of 2000, I would imagine would bump 
12 up, if the Board of Pardons is willing to give him a 
13 credit for time served, that would bump up his relea v? 
14 date, which could possibly bump up his admittance into 
15 the sex offender treatment programs out at the prison 
16 THE COURT: Have you got any other sugges 
17 Any other suggestion you might have as some kind of *r 
18 patient program? 
19 MS- BUCHI: My other suggestion is intensive 
20 supervision with out-patient treatment. I know the e -
21 is opposed to that, as is A P 4 P» 
22 THE COURT: I guess emotionally, I am a 11ti 
23 bit on the other side of that one, too* As many vietiiw 
24 as there are and just reading a tiny, tiny bit of the 
25 report, I didn't get much of a—I don't know how this 
9 
1 would be on probation, whether those could be concurrent? 
2 THE COURT: All three? 
3 MS. BUCHI: Yes. 
4
 THE COURT: No- I'll let the Board of Pardons 
5 can do that if they fell it appropriate, but I think when 
6 you have six victims, that the zero to ten is appropriate 
7 with two running consecutive and one being concurrent 
8 with either one of those that are consecutive to each 
9 other. 
10 Anything else, Ms. Buchi, right now? 
11 MS. BUCHI: Can we also make a recommendation 
12 that be—he be considered as soon as possible for the— 
13 THE COURT: If—if my recommendation™ 
14 MS. BUCHI: —treatment? 
15 THE COURT: —carries any weight, I'd certainly 
16 make the recommendation that as quickly as he can be put 
17 into one of these programs that deal with the offenses 
18 that he's pled guilty to, that he be sent to these sex 
19 | offender programs. Right? No question there. 
20 MS. BUCHI: And—well, and your recommendation 
21 actually does carry more weight than mine does; so if I 
22 could— 
23 THE COURT: How about Mr. Strongberg? Then 
24 you'd have the heaviest— 






























COURT: —on the order. 
BUCHI: How is that A P & P— 
STRONGBERG: Probably that Agent Hibler's 





BUCHI: And I'll call him as well. 
STRONGBERG: He's—will be making a 







Anything else right now? 
Mr. Bird, we haven't let you 
you want to say anything? 
MR. BIRD: Yes, I do, Judge. 
frustrating me most is they always put 
• 
say much, but do 
I guess what's 
negativity but 
they have not put anything in the facts. Susan Nexan, 
which was— 
THE COURT: Should be like a positive thinq 
you/re— 
MR. BIRD: Well, yes. That's what I was trying 
to say. Susan Nexan was my counselor and she used to 
call me diamond in the rough— 
THE COURT: I think I read that in here. 
MR. BIRD: —because of the fact that I was 
12 
making great progress. I have made a lot of headway, I 
know all my cycles, I know my red flags. If given the 
chance, I could complete any program and I'll show 
whoever wants to be shown that I won't do this again. I 
did this for help, I have changed— 
THE COURT: And you lost me on that because I 
think you've used that phrase before. You did this for 
help and that's— 
MR. BIRD: Attention getter. This is not a— 
THE COURT: Oh, really? 
MR. BIRD: Well—-
THE COURT: No other way to get attention? 
MR. BIRD: Not—that's not a point, Judge, it's 
not a point that I could find in time, if you understand, 
you know, I— 
THE COURT: I see. 'Cause you were in another 
mind set? 
MR. BIRD: Right. Yes. That was back then, 
you know, but not now. And you know, that's—frustrates 
me because I know I can succeed if given a chance. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I—I hope—maybe if I 
can convey this to you, I mean, besides sitting here 
trying to do what's right for you, there is according to 
the duty I have to the community— 
MR. BIRD: Uh huh. 
13 
1 THE COURT: —and I have to be candid with you, 
2 this kind of offense, in any community, 1 think it can't 
3 be tolerated, 
4 MR, BIRD: Well, I understand that. 
5 THE COURT: So, I have really no compunction 
6 sending you to the prison. I appreciate you're as worthy 
7 an individual as anybody to be watched over, cared for, 
8 nurtured; right? But there are six people at least who 
9 we know who have been harmed and it doesn't seem to me 
10 that this prison term is disproportionate to the crime 
11 you've committed. 
12 I So, we've got those two competing interests, 
13 your own benefit plus some kind of punishment for the 
14 harm that we can't in any way condone in this society, so 
15 I think that's where I come out, that's why I'm 
16 comfortable sending you to the prison. 
17 I'm appreciative with your attitude that you're 
18 going to make the best of it, but I think you have to do 
19 it in the confines of the prison. 
20 MR. BIRD: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. Thanks to you both. 
22 MS. BUCHI: Thank you, your Honor. That's all 
23 I have. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you. 




























STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
received an electronically recorded videotape of the 
within matter and under his supervision have transcribed 
the same into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 14, inclusive, to the best of my 
ability constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of 
February, 2002. 
• * > * . < -
Transcriber 
J 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day 
of February, 2002. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P SMITH 
385 BRAHMA ORJVE 
MURRAY UT 84107 
COMMISSION EXP.RES 
DECEMBER 4, 2005 
STATE OF UTAH 0 J ?&<*it4/*\ 
Notary Public 




























STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of 
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically 
recorded videotape of the within matter and caused the 
same to be transcribed into typewriting, and that the 
foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 14, inclusive, to the 
best of my knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this " 7-•- day of 
February, 2002. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P SMITH 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 
,.„ MURRAY, UT 84107 
Ijt COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DECEMBER 4, 2005 
STATE Of UTAH 
( S E A L ) 
Notary Public 
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